High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program
US
3 ionosphere heating facilities
HAARP,
HIPAS, Fairbanks, Alaska
Arecibo Observatory, Puerto Rico
HAARP
ionosphere research facility
Gakona, Alaska
remote access, operate from remote location
military, Air Force
European Incoherent Scatter Scientific Association (EISCAT),
Tromso, Norway
Russia
Sura ionospheric heating facility
Vasilsursk, near Nizhniy Novgorod
US Canada
Cape Race, Newfoundland
technical memorandum 195, 613 pages
the RFP (Request For Proposal) contract document for the initial HAARP facilities, a compilation of 80 scientists work, a conference sponsored by U.S.G. (USG, United States Government)
1st phase, 1 giga Watt, 1 billion Watt
2nd phase, 10 giga Watt, 10 billion Watt
3rd phase, 100 giga Watt, 100 billion Watt
source:
High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program
www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5I6FhUnP0
www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5I6FhUnP0
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------>
Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the black box: technology and economics, 1982
p.144
But even here, practical experience with the new technology often precedes scientific knowledge - by providing the unexpected observation or experience that gives rise to fundamental research.
p.144
For example, in the early days of radio, amateurs were assigned the range of short-wave signals - less than 200 meters - precisely because the authorities thought that nothing much could be done with such waves. As it turned out, clever amateurs, who did not know that nothing could be done, quickly demonstrated that effective transmission was possible in the short-wave range. Establishing precisely why this performance so vastly exceeded expectations led to major discoveries on the nature of the ionosphere.6
6 Cohen, Science, chap. 16.
(Inside the black box./ Nathan Rosenberg, 1. technological innovations., 2. technology─social aspects., HC79.T4R673 1982, 338'.06, first published 1982, )
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------>
Sharon Weinberger, The imagineers of war : the untold history of DARPA, the
pentagon agency that changed the world, 2017
pp.92-93
a method of communicating with nuclear-armed submarines while they prowled the seas using extremely low frequencies.
p.97
Arecibo Observatory, a radio telescope funded by ARPA under the auspices of the Defender program.
Arecibo was ostensibly for use in research related to ballistic missile defense,
It was simply an excellent science facility that would be used by academics to study the ionosphere.
(The imagineers of war : the untold story of DARPA, the Pentagon agency that changed the world / by Sharon Weinberger., New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 2017, united states. defense advanced research projects agency──history. | military research──united states. | military art and science──technological innovations──united states. | science and state──united states. | national security──united states──history. |
united states──defenses──history., U394.A75 W45 2016 (print) | U394.A75 (ebook) |
355/.040973, 2017, )
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------>
electromagnetic radiation
Radio waves are a type of electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths in the electromagnetic spectrum longer than infrared light. Radio waves have frequencies from 300 GHz to as low as 3 kHz, and corresponding wavelengths from 1 millimeter to 100 kilometers.
GHz - Giga Hertz
kHz - kilo Hertz
Giga - 1,000,000,000
mega - 1,000,000
kilo - 1000
Hertz - cycle per second
Microwaves are radio waves with wavelengths ranging from as long as one meter to as short as one millimeter, or equivalently, with frequencies between 300 MHz (0.3 GHz) and 300 GHz.
V = very
U = ultra
E = extreme
S = super
(vues - cues - ues)
( u - sound u u u )
( s - sound s s s )
( us - sound uess )
VHF
UHF and EHF (millimeter waves)
SHF
microwave oven
radiofrequency heating, at 10 to 20 megahertz (wavelength 15 to 30 meters)
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------>
how to leverage nature
VLF very low frequency
ionosphere magnetosphere
VLF transmitter
energy amplifier, amplify 1000 times
tapped into natural energy
earthquake ( weaponize earthquake )
weather ( U.S. military secret program to weaponize weather ??? )
create man-made self-organized critical (SOC) state
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------>
Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope, 1966
Tragedy and Hope
RADAR
Just as the war began, Professor John T. Randall, at the University of Birmingham, invented the resonant-cavity megnetron, an object no bigger than a first, which broadcasts high-power, very short, radio waves.
This ended interference from ground reflections or reflections from the ionosphere, and allowed sharp discrimination of objects without need for long antennae or high towers. [Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope, 1966, pp.844-845 (pdf pages 857-858)]
pp.844-845 (pdf pages 857-858)
... Through Churchill's influence, Lindemann was forced on Tizard's Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defense, where he acted as a disruptive influence from July 1935, until the 3 scientific members (Hill, Blackett, and Wimperis) forced him off in September 1936 by resigning together. The whole committee was then dissolved and reappointed under Tizard without Lindemann. The latter was reversed the tables four years later when Churchhill became prime minister with Lindemann as almost his only scientific adviser. Tizard was dropped from the committee in June 1940. But by that time the great work of in RADAR was done.
The Tizard Committee, with only 10,000 pound for research, held its first meeting on January 28, 1935, and by June 16th (before Lindemann joined) had a radar set on which they followed a plane 40 miles. On March 3, 1936, they identified a plane flying at 1,500 feet 75 miles away. In September 1938, five stations southeast of London followed Chamberlain's plane flying to the Munich Conference, and on Good Friday 1939, as Mussolini was invading Albania, a chain of 20 stations began continuous operations along the eastern coast.
One of the chief advances here was Watson-Watt's use of a cathode vacuum tube (such as we now use in television) to watch the returning radio signal. ([CRT - Cathode Ray Tube]) This signal, sent out from a radio vacuum tube in pulses, returned through a crystal detector to appear as a "blip," or spot, on the cathode tube's fluorescent screen. The shorter the wavelength of the sending wave, the sharper and more accurate the returning signal the shorter the necessary aeriel, and the lower the transmitting tower; but vacuum tubes could not broadcast waves less than 10 meters in length (300,000 kilocycles). Just as the war began, Professor John T. Randall, at the University of Birmingham, invented the resonant-cavity megnetron, an object no bigger than a first, which broadcasts high-power, very short, radio waves. This ended interference from ground reflections or reflections from the ionosphere, and allowed sharp discrimination of objects without need for long antennae or high towers. By the time magnetron came into use (1941), broadcasting from the tubes had been improved to allow use of 1.5 meter waves, but the magnetron was devoloped for 0.1 meter waves. All subsequent radar development was based on it. At the same time, great advances were being made in crystals for detectors. This later grew into the use of artificial crystals (transistors) for amplification in receivers as well as for detection.
In August 1940, Sir Henry Tizard, ousted from his committee by Lindemann, led a British scientific mission to Washington. He brought a large box of blueprints and reports on British scientific work, including radar, a new explosive (RDX, half again as powerful as TNT), studies on gaseous diffusion of uranium isotopes for an atom bomb, and much else. This visit gave a great impetus to American scientific work. As one consequence of it, 350 men from the United States were working in the radar net stations in England by November 1941 (a month before Pearl Harbor).
(Tragedy and Hope, by Carroll Quigley, 1966)
<-------------------------------------------------------------------------->
Jeffrey T. Richelson., The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology, 2001
pp.36-37
Rather than relying on aircraft or eavesdropping antennae, the project employed an over-the-horizon (OTH) radar to monitor Soviet missile test. Such radars use the ionosphere as a reflector for high-frequency radio energy and therefore are not limited to the “line-of-sight” restrictions of conventional ground-based radars. OTH radars promised to provide information on missile and aircraft activity up to 3,100 miles away ── by bouncing a radio signal off the ionosphere and onto the target and receiving the reflected signal. The technology had been tested by the CIA, which, along with the Office of Naval Research, shared a U.S.-based radar facility code-named CHAPEL BELL.166
p.33
telemetry intercept station
Intelligence analysts within the CIA as well as outside advisers, such as future Secretary of Defense William Perry, then at Sylvania, wondered if the low-powered signals that the Soviet missiles would transmit 20 miles to stations on Soviet territory could also be intercepted 1,000 miles away in Iran. CIA officials gained the Shah's permission for a contingent of technicians to set up antennae in an ancient hunting castle at Beshahr to conduct hearability tests. The test were to determine how well signals from the Tyuratam test range, which the CIA believed would become a major Soviet test facility, could be intercepted.152
p.91
Between May and October 1966, a C-135, as part of Operation Briar Patch, flew over the Barents Sea intercepting signals from a Hen House radar.*
*There was also a land-based component to Briar Patch. Gene Poteat concluded that given the size of the radar and its probable high power, it should be possible to pick up it signal out to several hundred miles, regardless of where the signal was pointed. The signal would be scattered forward and over the horizon via a phenomenon known as tropospheric scatter. Based on intelligence that a Hen House was under construction a couple of hundred miles inland from Riga, Poteat located an island in the Baltic that appeared to be the right distance from the Hen House to install a tropospheric-scatter receiver that could intercept and continuously monitor the radar.
After extensive negotiation to gain access, OEL [office of ELINT] installed dual antennae, about fifty wavelength apart, to reduce the expected atmospheric fading, and the receiver was put on automatic pilot. The Briar Patch system finally picked up the transmission from the targeted Hen House and every subsequent transmission. From monitoring the radar, the CIA learned that it traced U.S. satellites from the first orbit. It appears that the Soviets had an “incredibly effective espionage network to tip off the Hen House when a U.S. intelligence satellite was about to be launched.” According to Poteat, when there was a lengthy hold of an impending launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Hen House would switch off and come back on the air the instant the satellite lifted off from Vandenberg. (Gene Poteat, “Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT, 1960-1975”, Studies in Intelligence 42, 1 [Spring 1998]: 51-59.)
(The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology / Jeffrey T. Richelson., 1. united states. central intelligence agency. directorate of science and technology ── history., UB251.U5 R53 2001, )
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------>
Jeffrey T. Richelson., The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology, 2001
Hen House radar, 89-90
Hen Roost radar, 47, 48
“”
─
p.17
Sary Shagan, where radars were tested against missiles fired from Kapustin Yar,
p.47
a pair of radars the U.S. intelligence community designated Hen House and Hen Roost. located on the western shore of Lake Balkhash in the USSR
Sary Shagan antiballistic missile (ABC) test center
p.47
ELINT collection and analysis also focused on two targets that appeared in 1960 U-2 and CORONA photography ── a pair of radars the U.S. intelligence community designated Hen House and Hen Roost.
p.47
Both were located on the western shore of Lake Balkhash in the USSR and looked out from the Sary Shagan antiballistic missile (ABM) test center toward Kapustin Yar, the launch point for ballistic missiles employed in ABM tests.
p.47
Both facilities were enormous. The Hen House antenna building was over 900 feet long ── more than 3 football fields ── and nearly 50 feet high. The Hen Roost radar had 2 antennae, a half-mile apart, each over 500 feet long. One antenna was a mere 15 feet tall; the other reached 65 feet.53
Radars of this type were just being developed in the United States. Rather than employing traditional radar dishes that were mechanically steered, the face of these phased-array radars consisted of radiating elements. The delay in the signals sent out from those elements meant a beam could be electronically steered to detect incoming objects.
p.47
They needed information on the system's operating characteristics in order to determine whether the radars could provide the data required by Soviet ABMs to destroy incoming U.S. warheads, and how to neutralize the radars.
p.48
electronic signals emitted by Hen House or Hen Roost would head off into space before they could be intercepted by U.S. antennae.
p.48
The release of such vast amounts of energy can cause radical changes in the radio transmission properties of the surrounding atmosphere. In the highly ionized region created by the nuclear blast, radar waves, which would ordinarily travel straight into space, can be reflected or bent in different directions. On October 28, one of the ABM-related tests at Sary Shagan had just that effect.
p.48
The signal of greatest interest was originally designated BUEB, which analysis indicated was designated to be used against targets more than 800 miles away. Aircraft flying at the highest altitudes are well below the horizon when they are 300-400 miles from a radar, and they travel rather slowly. Ballistic missiles rise several hundred miles above the earth and approach their target rapidly, making it desirable to detect them as far away as possible. BUEB therefore became a prime candidate to be an ABM radar signal. In addition, each pulse was transmitted at a different frequency, which would be expected from an electronically steered radar beam.
Hen House radar, 89-90
Hen Roost radar, 47, 48
“”
─
pp.89-90
Among the intelligence issues the intercepts helped resolve was the Hen House radar. In January 1964, the NRL's 150-foot antenna at Chesapeake Bay, programmed with information from other sources about Hen House's frequency, made the first intercept of the radar's BUEB signal after it ricocheted off the moon ── although it was not clear at the time whether the intercept was of a Hen House signal or a Hen Roost signal. Analysts were able to determine that the signal was from a phased-array radar and made considerable progress in determining the radar's signal characteristics. They also determined that the signal came from Sary Shagan.104
p.90
In early 1965, the issue was settled by a CIA contractor, ESL, Inc., founded by future Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. ESL proved with mathematical rigor that the BUEB signal came from Hen House ── a radar that would be employed for ABM, early warning, and space tracking purposes.105
p.90
CIA's Palo Alto facility, which had been chosen because of its potential with regard to westward-looking Soviet radars,
The facility consisted of “quite sophisticated collection equipment, including two unique receivers”, which were built particularly for the moonbounce mission. In August 1965, Palo Alto made its first intercept of a Hen House radar signal, a signal it was able to observe for 38 hours a month.106
p.90
three major conclusions: First, the Hen House signal had a “spread-spectrum” mode ── the frequency spread of the signal could be deliberately broadened to increase the radar's range or its accuracy in reading the target's speed. Second, Hen House relied on an advanced scanning system that enabled the radar not only to search for a target but also to dwell on it for a short time. The brief look allowed the identification and measurement of the radar's signal parameters. Finally, the moonbounce data led to estimates that the peak power of the Hen House transmitter was 25 megawatts, making it one of the highest power radars in the world. These findings led to a fourth conclusion, with proved correct ── the Hen House was a new, sophisticated ABM radar. On the basis of that conclusion, the United States could begin developing countermeasures and tactics to reduce its effectiveness.107
─
“”
pp.91-92
p.91
flying its Power and Pattern Measurement System (PPMS) on various Air Force planes in order to determine the power and coverage of the Soviet radars designed to detect penetrating aircraft.108
p.91
Choosing which radars to target involved balancing intelligence priorities, air access, and eavesdropping conditions. Preference was given to targets in isolated areas where signals from other radars would not interfere. Radar signals were identified in advance, using direction finding equipment that was part of the airborne system. Special navigational instruments recorded the aircraft's position and altitude during each collection operation so that analysts would know exact geometric relationships between the radar and the measurement system. Several projects were completed in six missions or less, whereas others required more than forty flights.109
p.91
Between May and October 1966, a C-135, as part of Operation Briar Patch, flew over the Barents Sea intercepting signals from a Hen House radar.*
*There was also a land-based component to Briar Patch. Gene Poteat concluded that given the size of the radar and its probable high power, it should be possible to pick up it signal out to several hundred miles, regardless of where the signal was pointed. The signal would be scattered forward and over the horizon via a phenomenon known as tropospheric scatter. Based on intelligence that a Hen House was under construction a couple of hundred miles inland from Riga, Poteat located an island in the Baltic that appeared to be the right distance from the Hen House to install a tropospheric-scatter receiver that could intercept and continuously monitor the radar.
After extensive negotiation to gain access, OEL [office of ELINT] installed dual antennae, about fifty wavelength apart, to reduce the expected atmospheric fading, and the receiver was put on automatic pilot. The Briar Patch system finally picked up the transmission from the targeted Hen House and every subsequent transmission. From monitoring the radar, the CIA learned that it traced U.S. satellites from the first orbit. It appears that the Soviets had an “incredibly effective espionage network to tip off the Hen House when a U.S. intelligence satellite was about to be launched.” According to Poteat, when there was a lengthy hold of an impending launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Hen House would switch off and come back on the air the instant the satellite lifted off from Vandenberg. (Gene Poteat, “Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT, 1960-1975”, Studies in Intelligence 42, 1 [Spring 1998]: 51-59.)
p.44
Office of ELINT (OEL)
ELINT activities
Office of Electronic Activities, encroached on other people's territory,
Office of Electronic [Signals] Intercept was too explicit.
(“DD/R staff minutes 15 June 1962”, June 18, 1962, 2000 CIA release.)
─
“”
p.93
over-the-horizon (OTH) radars
By September 1965, the EARTHLING radar in Pakistan had detected 65 missiles known to have been launched from that site when EARTHLING was operational. A few of the detections had not been noticed by any other collection system, possibly the result of some combination of aborts not picked up by any line-of-sight collection system or false alarms.111
p.93
over-the-horizon (OTH) radars
In May 1965, as U.S.-Pakistani relations deteriorated and the United States faced loss of all its intelligence facilities in Pakistan, ORD began to install an OTH [over-the-horizon] radar system called CHECKROTE on Taiwan ── but only after Wheelon had exerted considerable effort to move a graveyard inconveniently located on the intended site. The radar's primary function was to monitor missile launches from China's Shuang-cheng-zi missile complex. By August 1, 1966, CHECKROTE was up and running.
─
“”
(The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology / Jeffrey T. Richelson., 1. united states. central intelligence agency. directorate of science and technology ── history., UB251.U5 R53 2001, )
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------>
Jeffrey T. Richelson., The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology, 2001
Hen House radar, 89-90
Hen Roost radar, 47, 48
“”
─
p.17
Sary Shagan, where radars were tested against missiles fired from Kapustin Yar,
p.47
a pair of radars the U.S. intelligence community designated Hen House and Hen Roost. located on the western shore of Lake Balkhash in the USSR
Sary Shagan antiballistic missile (ABC) test center
p.47
Both facilities were enormous. The Hen House antenna building was over 900 feet long ── more than 3 football fields ── and nearly 50 feet high. The Hen Roost radar had 2 antennae, a half-mile apart, each over 500 feet long. One antenna was a mere 15 feet tall; the other reached 65 feet.53
Radars of this type were just being developed in the United States. Rather than employing traditional radar dishes that were mechanically steered, the face of these phased-array radars consisted of radiating elements. The delay in the signals sent out from those elements meant a beam could be electronically steered to detect incoming objects.
p.47
They needed information on the system's operating characteristics in order to determine whether the radars could provide the data required by Soviet ABMs to destroy incoming U.S. warheads, and how to neutralize the radars.
p.48
electronic signals emitted by Hen House or Hen Roost would head off into space before they could be intercepted by U.S. antennae.
p.48
The release of such vast amounts of energy can cause radical changes in the radio transmission properties of the surrounding atmosphere. In the highly ionized region created by the nuclear blast, radar waves, which would ordinarily travel straight into space, can be reflected or bent in different directions. On October 28, one of the ABM-related tests at Sary Shagan had just that effect.
p.48
The signal of greatest interest was originally designated BUEB, which analysis indicated was designated to be used against targets more than 800 miles away. Aircraft flying at the highest altitudes are well below the horizon when they are 300-400 miles from a radar, and they travel rather slowly. Ballistic missiles rise several hundred miles above the earth and approach their target rapidly, making it desirable to detect them as far away as possible. BUEB therefore became a prime candidate to be an ABM radar signal. In addition, each pulse was transmitted at a different frequency, which would be expected from an electronically steered radar beam.
Hen House radar, 89-90
Hen Roost radar, 47, 48
“”
─
pp.89-90
Among the intelligence issues the intercepts helped resolve was the Hen House radar. In January 1964, the NRL's 150-foot antenna at Chesapeake Bay, programmed with information from other sources about Hen House's frequency, made the first intercept of the radar's BUEB signal after it ricocheted off the moon ── although it was not clear at the time whether the intercept was of a Hen House signal or a Hen Roost signal. Analysts were able to determine that the signal was from a phased-array radar and made considerable progress in determining the radar's signal characteristics. They also determined that the signal came from Sary Shagan.104
p.90
In early 1965, the issue was settled by a CIA contractor, ESL, Inc., founded by future Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. ESL proved with mathematical rigor that the BUEB signal came from Hen House ── a radar that would be employed for ABM, early warning, and space tracking purposes.105
p.90
CIA's Palo Alto facility, which had been chosen because of its potential with regard to westward-looking Soviet radars,
The facility consisted of “quite sophisticated collection equipment, including two unique receivers”, which were built particularly for the moonbounce mission. In August 1965, Palo Alto made its first intercept of a Hen House radar signal, a signal it was able to observe for 38 hours a month.106
p.90
three major conclusions: First, the Hen House signal had a “spread-spectrum” mode ── the frequency spread of the signal could be deliberately broadened to increase the radar's range or its accuracy in reading the target's speed. Second, Hen House relied on an advanced scanning system that enabled the radar not only to search for a target but also to dwell on it for a short time. The brief look allowed the identification and measurement of the radar's signal parameters. Finally, the moonbounce data led to estimates that the peak power of the Hen House transmitter was 25 megawatts, making it one of the highest power radars in the world. These findings led to a fourth conclusion, with proved correct ── the Hen House was a new, sophisticated ABM radar. On the basis of that conclusion, the United States could begin developing countermeasures and tactics to reduce its effectiveness.107
─
“”
pp.91-92
p.91
flying its Power and Pattern Measurement System (PPMS) on various Air Force planes in order to determine the power and coverage of the Soviet radars designed to detect penetrating aircraft.108
p.91
Choosing which radars to target involved balancing intelligence priorities, air access, and eavesdropping conditions. Preference was given to targets in isolated areas where signals from other radars would not interfere. Radar signals were identified in advance, using direction finding equipment that was part of the airborne system. Special navigational instruments recorded the aircraft's position and altitude during each collection operation so that analysts would know exact geometric relationships between the radar and the measurement system. Several projects were completed in six missions or less, whereas others required more than forty flights.109
p.91
Between May and October 1966, a C-135, as part of Operation Briar Patch, flew over the Barents Sea intercepting signals from a Hen House radar.*
*There was also a land-based component to Briar Patch. Gene Poteat concluded that given the size of the radar and its probable high power, it should be possible to pick up it signal out to several hundred miles, regardless of where the signal was pointed. The signal would be scattered forward and over the horizon via a phenomenon known as tropospheric scatter. Based on intelligence that a Hen House was under construction a couple of hundred miles inland from Riga, Poteat located an island in the Baltic that appeared to be the right distance from the Hen House to install a tropospheric-scatter receiver that could intercept and continuously monitor the radar.
After extensive negotiation to gain access, OEL [Office of ELINT] installed dual antennae, about fifty wavelength apart, to reduce the expected atmospheric fading, and the receiver was put on automatic pilot. The Briar Patch system finally picked up the transmission from the targeted Hen House and every subsequent transmission. From monitoring the radar, the CIA learned that it traced U.S. satellites from the first orbit. It appears that the Soviets had an “incredibly effective espionage network to tip off the Hen House when a U.S. intelligence satellite was about to be launched.” According to Poteat, when there was a lengthy hold of an impending launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Hen House would switch off and come back on the air the instant the satellite lifted off from Vandenberg. (Gene Poteat, “Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT, 1960-1975”, Studies in Intelligence 42, 1 [Spring 1998]: 51-59.)
p.44
Office of ELINT (OEL)
ELINT activities
Office of Electronic Activities, encroached on other people's territory,
Office of Electronic [Signals] Intercept was too explicit.
(“DD/R staff minutes 15 June 1962”, June 18, 1962, 2000 CIA release.)
─
“”
p.93
over-the-horizon (OTH) radars
By September 1965, the EARTHLING radar in Pakistan had detected 65 missiles known to have been launched from that site when EARTHLING was operational. A few of the detections had not been noticed by any other collection system, possibly the result of some combination of aborts not picked up by any line-of-sight collection system or false alarms.111
p.93
over-the-horizon (OTH) radars
In May 1965, as U.S.-Pakistani relations deteriorated and the United States faced loss of all its intelligence facilities in Pakistan, ORD began to install an OTH [over-the-horizon] radar system called CHECKROTE on Taiwan ── but only after Wheelon had exerted considerable effort to move a graveyard inconveniently located on the intended site. The radar's primary function was to monitor missile launches from China's Shuang-cheng-zi missile complex. By August 1, 1966, CHECKROTE was up and running.
─
“”
(The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology / Jeffrey T. Richelson., 1. united states. central intelligence agency. directorate of science and technology ── history., UB251.U5 R53 2001, )
<------------------------------------------------------------------------------>
Jeffrey T. Richelson., The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology, 2001
p.90
CIA's Palo Alto facility, which had been chosen because of its potential with regard to westward-looking Soviet radars,
The facility consisted of “quite sophisticated collection equipment, including two unique receivers”, which were built particularly for the moonbounce mission.
(The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology / Jeffrey T. Richelson., 1. united states. central intelligence agency. directorate of science and technology ── history., UB251.U5 R53 2001, )
____________________________________
`Project PAMOR' (PAssive MOon Relay)
===========================================
electronic intelligence (`elint')
-------------------------------------------
Again, this was a dual-use system.
The world's first elint satellite and
astronomical observatory were
integrated into the same satellite bus,
with astronomy serving as an
operational front for the whole.
===========================================
electronic intelligence (`elint')
Again, this was a dual-use system. The world's first elint satellite and astronomical observatory were integrated into the same satellite bus, with astronomy serving as an operational front for the whole.
capturing radar signals reflected from the moon's surface
Cold War Science in Black and White:
US Intelligence Gathering and its Scientific Cover at the Naval Research Laboratory, 1948-62
1. David K. van Keuren1
1. 1Code 5204, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC 20375, USA; fax: +1 202 404 8681; dvk@ccs.nrl.navy.mil
Abstract
In the immediate post-World War II era, researchers with the US Naval Research Laboratory's Radio Counter Measures (RCM) Branch was active in developing electronic intelligence (‘elint’) technologies and techniques for collecting information on the Soviet Union and its allies. The work of the Branch was often hidden behind unclassified research and engineering programmes at the Laboratory. The first result of this effort was `Project PAMOR' (PAssive MOon Relay), which built radio antennae for capturing Soviet radar signals reflected from the moon's surface. Starting in 1954, RCM engineers established a working relationship with the Laboratory's Radio Astronomy Branch. The cooperation was directed towards the development of a 600-ft radio telescope for dual-purpose use in intelligence gathering and astronomical research. Although the 600-ft telescope was never built, a satellite-based alternative, called `GRAB' (Galactic RAdiation Background), was launched in June of 1960. Again, this was a dual-use system. The world's first elint satellite and astronomical observatory were integrated into the same satellite bus, with astronomy serving as an operational front for the whole. A second GRAB was launched in 1962. This interface of classified and basic research tells us about the pursuit of science and science-based technologies during the Cold War.
Keywords eletronic intelligence (elint), Friedman, GRAB, Project PAMOR, radio astronomy, Sugar Grove, Trexler
David K. Van Keuren (1997).
Van Keuren, David K. (1997). Moon in Their Eyes: Moon Communication Relay at the Naval Research Laboratory, 1951-1962. In Butrica, Andrew J. (Ed.), Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication (NASA SP-4217), pp. 9–18. [1]
____________________________________
http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4217/ch2.htm
James Trexler
The developments in Moon circuit communications eventually came to the attention of James Trexler, a radio engineer at the Naval Research Laboratory. His interest was piqued by a paper published by researchers at an ITT laboratory. Trexler developed plans for a system designed to intercept Soviet radar signals by detecting the transmissions that bounced off the Moon. This program, codenamed "Joe," began making regular observations in August 1949. Within a year, "Joe" was made an official Navy intelligence program, the Passive Moon Relay (PAMOR).
PAMOR (Passive Moon Relay) program in 1950
____________________________________
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Diana
'Moon bounce communication' demonstrated the feasibility of using the Moon as a passive reflector to transmit radio signals from one point on the Earth to the other, around the curve of the Earth. [Because radio signals basically travel in a straight line and does not travel around earth's curvature. ] This Earth-Moon-Earth (EME) or "moonbounce" path has been used in a few communication systems. One of the first was the secret US military espionage PAMOR (Passive Moon Relay) program in 1950, which sought to eavesdrop on Soviet Russian military radio communication by picking up stray signals reflected from the Moon. The return signals were extremely faint, and the US began secret construction of the largest parabolic antenna in the world at Sugar Grove, West Virginia. (See James Bamford, 1982, The puzzle palace, pp.167-169 for further information on Sugar Grove)
Moonbounce communication was abandoned by the military with the advent of communications satellites in the early 1960s. However it was used by amateur radio operators beginning in the 1960s and is still used by them today.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communication_Moon_Relay ____________________________________
written by James Bamford (The puzzle palace), 1982
p.89
Office of Signals Intelligence Operations (DDO): In the NSA's pecking order, this office, under the deputy director for Operations, has always been looked on as first among equals. Formerly known as the Office of Production, or simply PROD, it has a legion of eavesdroppers, codebreakers, linguists, traffic and signals analysts who constitute the largest single organization within the Puzzle Palace. At the helm of PROD from 1963 to 1968, first as deputy assistant director and later as assistant director, was Oliver R. Kirby, a chunky, crew-cut, NSA veteran who was given the Pentagon's highest civilian award in 1963, the Distinguished Civilian Service Award. In the spring of 1968, Kirby succumbed to the temptation of private industry and went to work for LTV Electrosystems, Incorporated, in Greenville, Texas, as vice president of advanced planning, a position he holds today with the successor company, E Systems, apparently one of the NSA's major suppliers of SIGINT hardware. It is E System, for example, along with IBM, that reportedly built the computers for NSA's massive listening post at Pine Gap, Australia, in the late 1960s.
LTV Electrosystems, Incorporated, in Greenville, Texas
E Systems
NSA's major suppliers of SIGINT hardware
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Jeffrey T. Richelson., The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology, 2001
p.97
E-Systems of Greenville, Texas,
(The wizards of Langley : inside the CIA's directorate of science and technology / Jeffrey T. Richelson., 1. united states. central intelligence agency. directorate of science and technology ── history., UB251.U5 R53 2001, )
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Project West Ford (also known as Westford Needles and Project Needles) was a test carried out by Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory on behalf of the United States military in 1961 and 1963 to create an artificial ionosphere above the Earth.[1] This was done to solve a major weakness that had been identified in military communications.[2]
At the height of the Cold War, all international communications were either sent through submarine communications cables or bounced off the natural ionosphere. The United States military were concerned that the Soviets might cut those cables, forcing the unpredictable ionosphere to be the only means of communication with overseas forces.[1]
To mitigate the potential threat, a ring of 480,000,000[3] copper dipole antennas (needles which were 1.78 centimetres (0.70 in) long and 25.4 micrometres (1.00 thou) [1961] or 17.8 micrometres (0.70 thou) [1963] in diameter)[4][5] were placed in orbit to facilitate global radio communication. The length was chosen because it was half the wavelength of the 8 GHz signal used in the study.[1] The dipoles collectively provided passive support to Project Westford's parabolic dish (located in the town of Westford) to communicate with distant sites. Walter E. Morrow started Project Needles at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory in 1958.[1]
medium earth orbit
source:
► https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_West_Ford
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